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Abstract Recent years have seen considerable attention paid to the methodology of
philosophy. The puzzle is simple—if philosophy is not an empirical discipline, how
can one philosophical theory be rationally preferred over another? One answer to
this question is that we should apply the theoretical virtues. Foremost among these
theoretical virtues is simplicity—so perhaps we should prefer simpler philosophical
theories to more complex ones. Huemer (Philos Q 59:216–236, 2009) objects that
the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will
argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler
theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on
the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage
with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.
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1 Introduction
There has been considerable attention paid to the methodology of philosophy in
recent years. The puzzle is simple—if philosophy is not an empirical discipline, how
can one philosophical theory be rationally preferred over another? One answer to
this question is that we should apply the theoretical virtues. Foremost among these
theoretical virtues is simplicity—so perhaps we should prefer simpler philosophical
theories to more complex ones.1 Huemer (2009) objects that the reasons to prefer
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simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is
mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can
also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind
and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue
of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.
I will argue that there are no principled reasons to think that appealing to
simplicity in philosophy is any more problematic than appealing to simplicity in
science; there are only practical differences that make it difficult to apply simplicity-
based arguments in philosophy. These practical issues differ from one case to
another. As a result, the work will have to be done on a case-by-case basis—
metaphilosophy goes hand-in-hand with philosophy. This paper is an attempt to
work through some of the details.
There have been several recent discussions about the relevance of simplicity to
philosophy, including Bennett (2009), Kriegel (2013), Sider (2013), Tallant (2013),
Willard (2014), Thomasson (2015), Huemer (2016), Biggs and Wilson (2017), Paul
(2016) and Brenner (2017). However, even those who have defended the use of
simplicity in philosophy have not challenged Huemer’s arguments. For example,
Brenner, defending the use of simplicity in philosophy, merely remarks that ‘[i]t’s not
obvious how [Huemer’s] arguments [against using simplicity in philosophy] would
generalize to debates elsewhere in philosophy, and in metaphysics in particular’. I will
argue that even in the areas Huemer focusses on, his arguments do not succeed.
Huemer discusses four arguments for favouring simpler theories—he calls them
the Empiricist Argument, the Likelihood Argument, the Numerousness Argument
and the Bounded Asymmetry Argument. I want to emphasize that Huemer has
performed a valuable service by extracting four clear arguments from a large
literature on simplicity (see Huemer’s paper for references). My disagreement with
Huemer is only over the extent to which they apply to philosophy.
Section 2 discusses the Empiricist Argument, which is based on the success of
simple theories. Section 3 discusses the Likelihood Argument, which is based on the
fact that complex models are compatible with more possible evidence, and so harder
to refute. Section 4 discusses the Numerousness Argument, which is based on the
fact that there are more variants of complex models. Section 5 discusses the Bounded
Asymmetry Argument, which is based on the fact that there is always a simplest
model, but no limit to the possible complexity of models. Section 6 concludes.
2 The empiricist argument
Why should scientists prefer simpler theories? The first argument Huemer discusses
is based on evidence. The idea is that we have obtained evidence that simpler
theories are more likely to be true than complex theories. Huemer suggests the
following argument:2
2 Compare McAllister (1996), Kuipers (2002), Norton (2003). I think they succumb to the circularity
objection below; compare Kelley (2010).
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1. Science has been highly successful in identifying truths
2. The best explanation for this is that its methodology is truth-conducive
3. Therefore scientific methodology is probably truth-conducive
4. The appeal to simplicity is a central part of scientific methodology
5. Therefore simplicity is probably a genuine mark of truth p. 218
Huemer argues, I think correctly, that the 1–5 argument is circular. For example,
how is (1) to be established? How do we know that science has been successful at
establishing truths? Why not think that science appears to identify truths, but is in
fact systematically mistaken, perhaps due to an evil demon? We would have to
discount this sceptical hypothesis, and it is plausible that we would need to appeal to
simplicity (or some such methodological principle) to do so.
Similarly, how is (2) to be established? Why think that the best explanation for
the success of science is that its method is truth-conducive? Why not think that the
best explanation for the success of science is that an evil demon has arranged things
this way? Presumably we need a theory of what makes an explanation good (and
best) which says that simpler explanations are good.
So I think Huemer is right to reject the Empiricist Argument as an explanation of
why scientists should prefer simpler theories.3 This makes it irrelevant to the debate
between myself and Huemer, where the question is whether appeals to simplicity in
philosophy are more problematic than they are in science.
3 Likelihood argument
What Huemer calls the ‘Likelihood Argument’ is based on the fact that evidence
tends to provide greater confirmation to simpler theories. On the standard definition
of confirmation (Salmon 1975), E confirms H iff P(E|H)[ P(E|- H), and E
disconfirms H iff P(E|H)\P(E|- H).4 Assuming we have just two theories, call
them Simple and Complex, our evidence, E, confirms Simple iff P(E|Sim-
ple)[P(E|Complex). Huemer explains the Likelihood Argument’ as follows:
The essential point is that typically a simple theory can accommodate fewer
possible sets of observations than a complex theory can: the simple theory
makes more specific predictions. The realization of its predictions is
consequently more impressive than the realization of the relatively weak
predictions of a complex theory. p. 221–222
3 Huemer also sets this argument aside because ‘the empiricist argument…makes no attempt to explain
why simplicity is truth-indicative. Thus even if it persuades sceptics of the value of simplicity, we would
still need the sort of explanatory theories considered in the following three subsections’ p. 218 I’m not
sure we would need such an explanatory theory, but this raises the delicate point of where we should
expect explanation to stop, which we need not get into.
4 See Salmon (1975). Salmon actually discusses P(H|E)[P(H), but this is equivalent to the inequality in
the text assuming that 0\ P(H)\ 1.
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For example, suppose we have two types of model, Simple and Complex, where
Simple theories predict E1, while Complex theories are compatible with E1 and E2:
Simple Complex
E1 E1 E2
P(E1|Simple) = 1[P(E1|Complex)
Thus E1 confirms Simple
A useful way to think about it is that Simple is confirmed by E1 because it faced the
possibility of elimination by E2.5
Huemer’s main example to demonstrate the idea compares linear (y = a ? bx)
and parabolic (y = a ? bx ? cx2) relationships between two variables. Huemer
points out that any three data points are compatible with the family of parabolic
curves, but some sets of three points eliminate all linear curves. So linear models
face refutation by three data points. If we have three data points that are compatible
with linear models then linear models have survived possible refutation, and so are
confirmed.
Huemer then argues that:
introducing additional entities into a theory has an effect similar to that of
introducing additional adjustable parameters into an equation: suppositions
about each of the additional entities can be adjusted to accommodate the data.
For example, when Leverrier hypothesized the existence of the planet Neptune
to account for observed anomalies in the orbit of Uranus, he had at least two
parameters to work with – the mass and orbit of the new planet. The values of
these parameters could be adjusted to accommodate the data about Uranus’
orbit. In contrast, had Leverrier hypothesized 83 new planets, he would have
had 166 adjustable parameters to work with, enabling the accommodation of a
far greater range of possible data. p. 222–223
Of course, it is possible that a simple hypothesis is compatible with more
evidence than a complex hypothesis. And it is possible that a piece of evidence
compatible with both a simple and a complex hypothesis will have higher likelihood
given the complex hypothesis. But I want to grant Huemer all the assumptions he
wants here, as I don’t want to object to the way he uses the concept of simplicity in
5 Compare Popper’s (1959) falsificationism.
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science. Quite the opposite—I endorse the way Huemer uses the concept of
simplicity in science, and want to extend the same treatment to philosophy.
So let’s apply this to the physicalism/dualism debate. We need to separate two
possible pieces of evidence: the causal closure of the physical and psychophysical
correlations. I’ll argue that in both cases the simpler physicalist/monist theory is
confirmed by the evidence.
3.1 Evidence 5 causal closure of the physical
3.1.1 The argument for physicalism
Let the evidence be the causal closure of the physical i.e. all physical effects have
physical causes. Does this evidence confirm physicalism? I will argue that it does.
The reason is that physicalism, a simple theory, is compatible with a narrower range
of evidence than dualism, a more complex theory. Specifically, dualism is
compatible with the failure of the causal closure of the physical:
Physicalism Dualism
Causal closure of the 
physical
Causal 
closure of 
the physical
No causal
closure of 
the physical
The dualist has posited something extra in the universe which, like positing more
planets orbiting Uranus, allows a greater range of possible evidence—in this case,
the failure of the causal closure of the physical.
It is trivial that physicalism entails the causal closure of the physical; while both
substance and property dualism allow (though do not entail6) that the physical is not
causally closed:
P(Causal closure of the physical | Physicalism) = 1[
P(Causal closure of the physical | Dualism)
Therefore the causal closure of the physical confirms physicalism.
6 We’ll bracket this and come back to it shortly.
Philosophers should prefer simpler theories
123
To put it another way, the simple physicalist theory is confirmed by the causal
closure of the physical because it faced refutation by a violation of the causal
closure of the physical.
3.1.2 Huemer’s objections
First, notice that we don’t need physicalism to entail the causal closure of the
physical. We get confirmation of physicalism iff:
P(Causal closure of the physical | Physicalism)[
P(Causal closure of the physical | Dualism).
We can now address the following complication: Huemer focusses, not on the
causal closure of the physical, but on the apparent causal closure of the physical i.e.
the physical world appears to be causally closed. This is an unexpected move.
Usually, it is assumed that when we acquire some evidence, we learn something
about the world. By focussing on the appearances, Huemer breaks this link. Having
flagged this, I don’t want to dwell on it, as I don’t think there is anything wrong with
focussing on appearances. The issue becomes whether:
(I) P(Apparent causal closure of the physical | Physicalism)[P(Apparent
causal closure of the physical | Dualism)?
And (I) is hard to deny. Dualism allows that the physical realm is not causally
closed, so will not appear to be causally closed given sufficiently good
experiments.7 By contrast, physicalism entails that the physical realm is causally
closed, so any apparent causal closure of the physical can only be the result of
misleading experiments. So the assumption that appearances tend to lead us towards
the truth will also lead us to hold that the apparent causal closure of the physical
supports physicalism.
Here is a good place to re-visit the point bracketed above that dualism does not
entail the failure of causal closure of the physical (let’s set aside ‘apparent’ here to
keep the exposition simple). The relation depends on the type of dualism. Regarding
substance dualism, Cartesian interactionism says the physical is not causally closed,
while Leibnizian pre-established harmony says the physical is causally closed.
Regarding property dualism (see Chalmers 1996, 2003), interactionist property
dualism says the physical is not causally closed; epiphenomenal and panpsychist
dualism say the physical is causally closed:
7 For example, we might observe particles in the brain behaving differently from how the laws of nature
predict they will behave. In response to the absence of such observations, Eccles (1986) uses quantum
indeterminacy to avoid violating causal closure in his dualistic theory, in which consciousness fills the
causal gaps. But Chalmers (1996, p. 157) points out that this ‘contradicts the quantum–mechanical
postulate that these microscopic decisions are entirely random’.
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Physicalism Dualism
Causal closure of the 
physical
Causal closure of 
the physical.
Pre-established 
harmony.
Epiphenomenalism. 
Panpsychism
No causal closure 
of the physical.
Cartesian 
interaconism, 
Interaconist 
property dualism
So the causal closure of the physical eliminates some versions of dualism (e.g.
Cartesian dualism) and confirms others (e.g. pre-established harmony). This sort of
structure—where a hypothesis is confirmed while some of its sub-hypotheses are
disconfirmed—is not unusual,8 and does nothing to undermine the Likelihood
Argument.
The lesson is that the Likelihood Argument is sensitive to the prior probabilities
of the hypotheses at issue. For example, suppose we had ruled out all the varieties of
dualism that allow the failure of causal closure of the physical (shaded). Then the
remaining versions of dualism would entail the causal closure of the physical,
giving the same likelihood as physicalism i.e. 1.
Returning to Huemer’s paper, he offers a number of considerations aimed at
undermining (I). I will argue that none succeed. First, Huemer imagines that ‘brain
scientists find that certain events in the brain cannot be accounted for in terms of
standard physical and chemical causes, but could be accounted for by the hypothesis
of non-physical mental causes.’ p. 232. He then points out that such evidence would
not force the abandonment of physicalism:
First, in the imagined scenario, physicalism would not be refuted, for
physicalists do not restrict the concept of physical properties to those presently
known to physics and chemistry. Hence if science discovered brain events
which could not be causally explained by hitherto recognized physical causes,
the physicalist could postulate a previously unknown type of physical cause
explaining those events. p. 232
Huemer is pointing out that the apparent failure of the causal closure of the physical
could be explained by physicalists (by postulating new physical causes), which
undermines:
P(Apparent causal closure of the physical | Physicalism) = 1.
Huemer is surely right about this. But we’ve seen that the physicalist does not need
such a strong assumption. The physicalist only needs:
8 For example, the evidence that Bob has a furry pet confirms that he has a dog, but disconfirms the sub-
hypothesis that he has a Peruvian hairless dog (see Kotzen 2012).
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P(Apparent causal closure of the physical | Physicalism)[
P(Apparent causal closure of the physical | Dualism)
whereas Huemer’s position that the evidence fails to confirm physicalism needs:
P(Apparent causal closure of the physical | Physicalism) B P(Apparent causal
closure of the physical | Dualism)
And as we saw above, this inequality is implausible.
Huemer offers a second objection to the argument for physicalism:
the evidence which would favour physicalism has not in fact been
acquired…In the present case, the evidence which would favour physicalism
has not been gathered, because scientists have not discovered a complete
causal explanation of all changes in the brain and all human behaviour: that is,
it is not yet known whether the observable facts will fall within the range
allowed by the theory. p. 232–233
Two responses. First, Huemer seems to have forgotten his own move of focussing
on the apparent causal closure of the physical. It may not yet be known that the
physical is causally closed, but it does appear that it is. And this evidence confirms
physicalism.
Second, the question is not whether we have evidence for physicalism, but
whether the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science also apply in philosophy.
Answers to this question do not depend on what evidence has actually been found,
they depend on what would be confirmed by possible evidence. And I have argued
that the causal closure of the physical would confirm physicalism.
3.2 Evidence 5 psychophysical correlations
3.2.1 The argument for physicalism
Next, let the evidence be psychophysical correlations i.e. each type of mental state is
correlated one-to-one with a type of physical state. And consider the hypothesis of
type-physicalism: for every actually instantiated mental property F, there is some
physical property G such that F = G.9 Would psychophysical correlations confirm
type-physicalism? Huemer says no; I say yes.
Here’s the likelihood argument for type-physicalism. Type-physicalism entails
that each type of mental state is correlated with a type of physical state, whereas the
more complex dualist theory leaves open the possibility that there is no correlation
between physical and mental states:
P(Psychophysical correlations | Type-physicalism) = 1[
P(Psychophysical correlations | Dualism)
Therefore the evidence confirms type-physicalism.
9 See Stoljar (2016). We’ll stipulate that G is relatively homogenous at the physical level, ruling out
multiply realizable physical properties which would not be in the spirit of type-physicalism.
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Type-physicalism Dualism
Psychophysical
correlaons
Psychophysical
correlaons
No  psychophysical
correlaons 
Again, the extra stuff the dualist posits allows a greater range of evidence. The
simple type-physicalist theory is confirmed by psychophysical correlations because
it faced refutation by an absence of psychophysical correlations.
(It is worth mentioning a similar argument for token physicalism. Dualism allows
the failure of supervenience. That is, dualism allows one-many relations between
physical and mental states e.g. c-fibres are related to pain in some instances, joy in
other instances and no mental state in further instances—the latter being a zombie
case (Chalmers 1996). Token physicalism entails supervenience, ruling out such
one-many relations. So supervenience confirms token physicalism.
Token-physicalism Dualism
Supervenience Supervenience No   supervenience
P(Supervenience | Token-physicalism) = 1[
P(Supervenience | Dualism)
Therefore supervenience confirms token-physicalism)
3.2.2 Huemer’s objections
Huemer only explicitly discusses type-physicalism, and objects that type-physical-
ism can allow a wide range of possible evidence, including non-actual psychophys-
ical correlations:
The physicalist’s adjustable parameters are assumptions about psychophysical
identities or supervenience relations. The physicalist can adjust assumptions
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about what sort of physical or functional states mental states supervene on, so
as to accommodate the observed psychophysical correlations. Any set of
supervenience relations is compatible with physicalism as such; so physical-
ism too is virtually guaranteed to be consistent with the data. p. 232
But Huemer has misidentified the evidence. He assumes the evidence is the specific
psychophysical correlations i.e. that pain is correlated with c-fibres firing rather than
with d-fibres firing. But it’s not the specific psychophysical correlations that confirm
type-physicalism—it’s the fact that there are any psychophysical correlations at all!
That is, it’s that pain is correlated with c-fibres firing rather than not correlated with
any physical property at all. This is the evidence that is entailed by type-physicalism
but not by dualism.
Huemer offers a couple of further objections. He considers the following
conditional, which he takes to be a new way of putting the argument for
physicalism: if physicalism could be refuted by the failure of concerted efforts to
identify robust type–type correlations then the discovery of type–type correlations
would confirm physicalism.
He responds by rejecting the antecedent, saying that
the imagined evidence [the failure of concerted efforts to identify robust type–
type correlations] would not refute physicalism, for most physicalists already
embrace the thesis of multiple realizability; thus they are not committed to the
existence of type–type correlations between mental and physical states. p. 233
This is a puzzling response. First, one cannot reject a conditional by rejecting the
antecedent, and it is the conditional that is at issue. Setting this aside, Huemer shifts
to token physicalism on the grounds that most physicalists are token-physicalists.
But this is not relevant. What’s relevant is whether type-physicalism could be
refuted by the failure of concerted efforts to identify robust type–type correlations.
And surely it could be (or at least it could be disconfirmed, which is what’s at issue).
Huemer then objects that ‘even if we accept that [type] physicalism would be
refuted by the failure to find type–type correlations…, this point does not favour
[type] physicalism over dualism until the type–type correlations are found’. p. 233
But the question isn’t whether we have evidence for type-physicalism; it’s
whether evidence compatible with it would confirm type-physicalism. Huemer
seems to have switched from the general question of whether philosophers should
prefer simpler theories to the specific question of whether type-physicalism is true.
3.3 Other debates
To what extent does this generalize to other debates in philosophy? The Likelihood
Argument can only apply when the competing theories predict different evidence. In
many cases philosophical debates agree on the evidence so the Likelihood
Argument won’t apply. Nevertheless, I think there are some philosophical debates
where it is plausible that evidence is relevant, and where the Likelihood Argument
applies.
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Let’s consider the nominalism versus Platonism debate, which Huemer discusses.
Let Platonism be the theory that posits objects and properties; let nominalism be the
theory that posits only objects. Nominalism is the simpler theory, so could evidence
confirm it? For nominalism to be confirmed by the Likelihood Argument, there must
have been possible evidence that would have refuted nominalism that has failed to
be found. But what possible evidence could have refuted nominalism? Huemer
argues that there is none—either nominalism can account for our actual evidence, in
which case it ‘is consistent with all possible data [evidence]’ (p. 234) or nominalism
cannot account for our actual evidence, in which case it is refuted.
But the first disjunct is problematic. It could be that nominalism can account for
our actual evidence, but is inconsistent with other possible evidence. (Huemer
doesn’t consider this possibility.)
For example, we might think that nominalists are committed to paraphrasing true
sentences that quantify over properties. Suppose actual true sentences that quantify
over properties can be paraphrased, but there are possible worlds with true sentences
that cannot be paraphrased. Then nominalism is inconsistent with the possible
evidence in these unparaphrasable worlds.
There might be other possible evidence that could refute nominalism, even if it
takes a bit more imagination. Schaffer (2003) defends the possibility of lone
properties. That is, although properties come in clusters (this page has mass, shaper,
colour etc.), there is no (necessary) reason why ‘the mass of this page [doesn’t]
break free, and wander off by itself, leaving its whiteness and smoothness behind’
p. 125. If we could observe such a lone property it would presumably refute
nominalism. As we have not, nominalism is confirmed.
Of course, one might reject such a possibility, or deny that we could obtain the
evidence suggested, but the point is that there seems to be possible evidence that
would refute nominalism.10 The more general point is that there seems to be nothing
about philosophy as such that prevents us from applying the Likelihood Argument.
It seems that the strategy of trying to find the simplest theory that is compatible
with our evidence applies to other topics. For example, Harman (1977) denies that
there are objective moral facts on the grounds that they are not needed to explain our
moral judgments. Call this relativism. In this case our judgments are taken to be
evidence. Could alternative judgments have refuted (or disconfirmed) relativism? If
so, the argument can be understood as saying that our moral judgments could have
disconfirmed relativism, and as they have not, relativism is confirmed. And Tallant
(2013) uses our judgment that [‘dinosaurs exist’ is false] as evidence for Presentism.
If our judgments are counted as evidence in this way, there seems to be no limit to
the possible application of the Likelihood Argument.11
In this section I argued that the Likelihood Argument for simpler theories can
apply in philosophy. But one characteristic feature of philosophy is that evidence
does not seem relevant in the same way it is in science, so the Likelihood Argument
10 Perhaps lone properties are negatively conceivable, meaning roughly that although we cannot
positively imagine it, we don’t get a contradiction if we try and we cannot rule it out a priori (Chalmers
2002).
11 I am sceptical that our judgments should count as evidence here, but that is a different story.
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might be less important in philosophy than in science. We need to turn to non-
evidence based arguments for simplicity—I turn to these for the rest of the paper
and argue that they can apply in philosophy.
4 Numerousness argument
The Numerousness Argument seeks to show that more complex theories have lower
prior probability. The strategy is to first group theories according to degree of
complexity i.e. a group of very simple theories, a group of less simple theories, and
so on. Then assign to each equivalence class of equally complex theories an equal—
or at least not wildly different—prior probability. Assuming there are more types of
complex theory than types of simple theory, that same prior probability must be
shared around more theories in the complex groups than around the simpler groups,
so each complex theory ends up with a lower prior.12 In this diagram, offered by
Huemer, the world has an equal probability of being simple or complex (1/2), but
each complex theory ends up with a lower probability (of 1/10 rather than 1/6):
Simple (1/2)
Complex (1/2) 
1/6 1/6 1/6
1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10
As Huemer puts it:
There is some reason for thinking that ontologically complex theories are in
fact more numerous than ontologically simple theories. The positing of new
entities generally allows multiple theories concerning the nature of those
entities; consequently, the more entities one posits, the more theories one can
construct about those entities. p. 220–221
4.1 Philosophy of mind
Let’s see if we can apply this to the philosophy of mind. Consider three theories:
Physicalism: There exists only a physical substance with only physical
fundamental properties
Idealism: There exists only a mental substance with only mental
fundamental properties
12 Three points by way of clarification. First, as this is an a priori argument, it inherits any worries about
prior probabilities one might have. But, second, it doesn’t commit us to favouring simplicity over
complexity a priori. It only commits us to favouring specific simple theories over specific complex
theories a priori. So we need not think the world is more likely to be simple than complex. Third, theories
that have a relatively high prior may well end up with a low posterior once evidence comes in.
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Neutral monism: There exists only a neutral substance that has both mental
and physical fundamental properties
The two relevant groups of theories are:
Monism: There exists exactly one type of substance
Dualism: There exists exactly two types of substance
Let’s assign monism and dualism an equal prior probability of  each. The
argument would then proceed that there are more dualistic theories than monistic
theories. As the
 probability must be spread over more dualistic theories than monistic theories,
each dualistic theory ends up with a lower prior.
However, Huemer argues that there are not more dualistic theories than monistic
theories. Huemer claims that:
[Monism] belongs to the larger class, since the class of monistic theories has at
least three members (physicalism, idealism and neutral monism), while the
class of dualistic theories of the mind–body relation has only one member
(dualism). P. 231
It seems that Huemer is considering only the following theories:
Monistic theories: 1) physicalism 2) idealism and 3) neutral monism
Dualistic theories: 1) physical substance ? mental substance
But these are not the only dualistic theories. With these three monistic theories,
we should allow three dualistic theories:
Dualistic theories:
1) physical substance ? mental substance
2) physical substance ? neutral substance
3) mental substance ? neutral substance
We get the same number of monistic and dualistic theories (three), so no argument
for monism yet. But as soon as we increase the number of types of substance, the
number of dualistic theories rapidly rises. With four types of substance there are
four monistic theories and six dualistic theories. Five types of substance allows five
monistic theories and ten dualistic theories. A priori, all of these types of substance
might exist, so they must all be included among the possibilities over which the
prior probability is distributed. The result will be that a priori there will be many
more dualistic theories, and so the Numerousness Argument can be applied.
Here is a diagram for four types of substance. Set aside all possibilities other than
monism and dualism, with each assigned a probability of 1/2. The four monistic
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theories therefore get a probability of 1/8 and the six dualistic theories get a
probability of 1/12:
Monism (1/2)
Dualism (1/2) 
1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8
1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12
So each (simple) monist theory gets a higher probability than each (complex) dualist
theory.
Perhaps the objection is that there are no plausible candidates for the extra types
of substance. But remember the Numerousness Argument is about the distribution
of priors, so everything epistemically possible a priori is relevant. And surely it is
epistemically possible a priori that there are biological substances, chemical
substances and others? And perhaps abstract objects are another substance. Indeed
perhaps different types of abstract object are different substances e.g. numbers,
propositions etc. And what about more exotic possibilia like angels and Greek gods?
And if we switch from substance dualism to property dualism it is very plausible
that there are many possible types of fundamental property e.g. physical,
phenomenal, intentional, biological, chemical, sociological, normative etc.13
4.2 Other debates
Can this Numerousness argument be applied to other areas of philosophy? I think a
preference for positing fewer types of objects can be found in the background of
many debates, and is so widely accepted that it is easy to overlook.
Start with nominalism versus Platonism. It is natural to conceptualize nominal-
ism as a theory that only posits one category—objects—and Platonism as a theory
that posits (at least) two categories—objects and properties. So, with a slight
extension of the usual terminology, nominalism is a variety of monism and
Platonism is a variety of dualism. The analysis above can then be applied—simpler
theories like nominalism have higher prior probabilities.
Huemer considers this but complains:
This would fail to deliver the result required by the nominalistic appeal to
simplicity, since again there are not more dualistic theories than monistic
theories on this issue. p. 231
The problem is that there is only one dualistic theory—Platonism—and two
monistic theories—that only objects exist and that only properties exist.
This is the same objection Huemer gives in the philosophy of mind case. Huemer
is right when there are only two possible categories. But why would we be limited to
two possible categories a priori? A priori, there are surely an indefinite number of
categories. Once we remember that the argument applies to priors, and don’t
13 Trialism has been defended by Cottingham (1985). Thanks to Ben Blumson for the reference.
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artificially restrict the range of prior possibilities, the Numerousness Argument
favouring simpler theories goes through.
Another natural candidate for the Numerousness Argument is the debate about
whether objects are fundamental or are constituted by bundles of properties. The
bundle theory, like nominalism, posits only one category; it posits properties rather
than objects. But what’s so good about one-category theories? They are good if we
have a preference for simpler theories. The Numerousness Argument gives us a
reason for this preference.14
The debate about the existence of numbers has a similar form. It seems to be
taken for granted that if we can avoid positing numbers, the nominalist wins (Field
1980). But why should this be? Presumably because we have a preference for an
ontology with fewer types of object, and the Numerousness Argument explains why.
Debates about material objects also have this structure. The nihilist posits only
fundamental particles like quarks, while common sense allows composite objects
like tables. One of the main arguments for nihilism is a preference for a simpler
ontology (Schaffer 2007, Cameron 2008). We could understand the nihilist as being
committed to only one type of object—simple objects—while common sense is also
committed to composite objects. The preference for a simpler ontology is explained
by the Numerousness Argument.
For an example outside metaphysics, Finlay and Schroeder (2017) say that
simplicity plays a role in the debate between reasons internalism versus externalism:
The idea behind this reasoning is that if we have to agree that some reasons
depend on desires, then we should give serious consideration to the theory
according to which all reasons do, as being simpler…than the theory
according to which some reasons derive from our desires but others do not.
The theory according to which all reasons depend on desires could be thought of as
a monistic theory, the theory that reasons depend on desires and morality a dualistic
theory, the theory that reasons depend on desires, morality and prudence a trialistic
theory, and so on.
And, switching from substances to properties, positing non-natural moral
properties (Moore 1903) is analogous to positing non-natural mental properties.
In both cases, the question is whether we have one type of fundamental property or
two, and it is widely assumed that by default we should prefer the possibility with
only one fundamental type of property. The Numerousness Argument promises to
explain why.
There is a limitation to this argument however. It will only apply when one
theory posits strictly more complexity than its competitor, and things are often not
so straightforward. Consider the debate about the foundations of modality:
On what we’ll call the Lewisian hypothesis, facts about modality are grounded
on facts about concrete worlds, and are best stated by quantifying over these
worlds.15
14 Paul (2016) explicitly defends a bundle theory on the grounds that it is a one-category theory.
15 Lewis (1986).
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On what we’ll call the Priorian hypothesis, facts about modality are primitive,
and are best stated using primitive operators such as possibly.16
There is a distinction between ontological (things in the world) and ideological
(concepts needed to describe the world) simplicity; and ontological simplicity then
divides into quantitative (number of things) and qualitative (number of types of
thing) simplicity.17 The disagreement between Lewisian and Priorian views is
plausibly rooted in disagreement about how to weigh up these different types of
simplicity.
The Priorian hypothesis scores well on qualitative and quantitiative ontological
simplicity. The ontological cost of the Priorian hypothesis is zero, as it posits no
new entities, nor types of entity. The cost comes in ideological complexity, as the
hypothesis posits primitive modal concepts.
The Lewisian hypothesis scores well on qualitative ontological simplicity and
ideological simplicity. The qualitative ontological cost of the Lewisian hypothesis is
zero,18 as it posits only types of thing that we already take to exist, namely concrete
worlds. The Lewisian hypothesis is also ideologically simple, as we don’t need
primitive modal concepts. The cost comes in quantitative ontological complexity, as
the hypothesis posits a possibly infinite number of concrete worlds. But Lewis
thought this cost was small.
The moral is that even if we agree that simpler theories are to be preferred, we
still have to work out which types of simplicity matter and how they should be
weighed against each other. The Numerousness Argument gives us a start, but there
is a lot more still to do.
5 Bounded Asymmetry
The Bounded Asymmetry argument starts from the fact that the complexity of
theories is unbounded in one direction only. Huemer writes:
for any given phenomenon, there is a simplest theory (allowing ties for
simplest), but no most complex theory of the phenomenon: however complex
a theory is, it is always possible to devise a more complicated one. This is
most easily seen if we take a theory’s complexity to be measured by the
number of entities that it posits: one cannot posit fewer than zero entities, but
for any number n, one could posit more than n entities. Similar points hold for
other measures of complexity, such as the number of parameters in an
equation. p. 219
16 Prior (1957).
17 And perhaps ideological simplicity divides into quantitative and qualitative; see Cowling (2013).
18 So Lewis claimed. A problem Lewis did not consider is that these possible worlds contain all sorts of
weird and wonderful types of things that do not actually exist (see Melia 1992). Thanks to a referee for
pointing this out. On the other hand, the Lewisian can use possible worlds to define propositions,
properties and other things (Lewis 1986, ch. 1) that the Priorian has to account for in some other way.
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Now note that the total probability across all possible hypotheses must sum to 1. As
there are more complex theories than simple ones, theories must get diminishing
probability as their complexity increases.
Huemer claims that this argument applies in science, but not in philosophy:
The argument…does not apply to the physicalism/dualism debate, because
physicalism and dualism are not naturally viewed as successive steps in some
infinite hierarchy of theories. P. 230
But the opposite seems to be true. Physicalism is a theory with one type of
substance; dualism is a theory with two types of substance; next comes three types
of substance; then four, etc. Is there any reason to think there couldn’t be an infinite
number of types of substance?
Huemer doesn’t say much to explain his position. He just says ‘The fundamental
question for physicalists and dualists is not ‘How many kinds of state are there?’,
but ‘What is the relationship between the mental and the physical?’ p. 230
In response, we can grant that the fundamental question for physicalists and
dualists is ‘What is the relationship between the mental and the physical?’
Nevertheless, they end up disagreeing on what kinds of state there are, so the prior
probability of the existence of each kind of state is relevant to what we should
believe. Compare: a fundamental question for physicists is ‘What are the
fundamental laws of nature?’. Nevertheless, the prior probability of any proposed
laws are relevant to what we should believe.
Similar considerations apply to the nominalism versus realism debate. Huemer
applies the same objection—that the debate is only about the relation between
objects and properties—so there are only two things that are relevant. But although
philosophers focus on this debate, there is no a priori reason to rule out an infinite
number of weird and wonderful types of thing. Only our imaginations seem to
prevent us from indefinitely expanding the list containing, numbers, propositions,
tropes fictional people, descriptive properties, normative properties, angels and
Greek gods. If so, the Boundary Asymmetry Argument suggests that each simpler
theory gets higher prior probability. I won’t go through all the other examples of the
last section, but it seems natural to extend this argument to other controversies in
philosophy.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that the reasons Huemer marshals for preferring simpler theories in
science also apply in philosophy. Physicalism is confirmed by the causal closure of
the physical and by psychophysical correlations. Huemer’s objections to the
Numerousness and Bounded Asymmetry arguments seem to arise because he
focusses on only the theories that are live contenders in contemporary philosophy.
But as these are both a priori arguments, we should not limit the relevant theories in
this way.
The overall result is that we have been able to apply the arguments Huemer
discusses to philosophical controversies. So there seems to be no principled reason
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why the considerations applied in scientific controversies should not also be applied
in philosophical controversies.
However, we have also found two limitations of the extent to which these
arguments can be applied in philosophy. First, the Likelihood Argument only
applies when one theory is compatible with strictly more evidence than its
competitors. The limitation here comes from the fact that many philosophical
theories do not disagree with each other about the evidence, so the Likelihood
Argument will not apply. Second, the Numerousness Argument and Boundary
Asymmetry Argument only apply when one theory describes a world that is strictly
more complex than its competitors. This will apply in some cases, but not in others.
Different types of simplicity will have to be traded off, and as it stands there is no
clear method for how this should be done. But these are all questions of detail that
will vary from one case to another—we have found no principled reason why
simplicity considerations should not be applied in philosophy.
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